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Virginia Woolf makes clear in her book A Room of One’s Own that “[A] woman
must have money and a room of her own if she is to write….” This statement extends to
all endeavors by women, including sport. The gap between men and women’s sports is
not bridged by monetary compensation. The domination of women exists in conceptual
ideals and how those are expressed through our roles in this world. I use Val Plumwood’s
ecological feminist theory to expose the blatant masculinity imposed upon sport. I shall
argue that sport is an arena of constant struggle over basic social conceptions of men and
women. My endeavor is to implore traditionally masculine territory, and show sport as
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[A] woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write
fiction.1
Not only was Virginia Woolf correct in her statement of the necessity of money
for women to write, but we may also apply this sentiment to the fair treatment of women
in sports. Many people like to think that money does not run the world or the individuals
whom inhabit it. Money does talk and unfortunately, it is the men who have dominated
and continue to dominate the conversation. Women involved in sports have historically
received less money, equipment, time, opportunity, and support. In order for womens
athletics to prosper and attain an equal footing with mens, women must have their own
money; it cannot reside in the hands of men.
It is obvious that mens athletics receive more money and support than womens
do. One only has to turn on the television to watch a football, basketball, baseball, or
soccer game. There are only a few female professional sports organizations. Those that
do exist are clearly not as popular or noteworthy as the NFL or NBA. These teams not
only receive huge sums of money from sponsors, but players are paid millions. Just as
professional sports receive more money than small-unorganized womens teams, college
and high schools follow suit. The money is distributed unequally in favor of mens sports,
therefore putting women at a great disadvantage. Yet, simply acknowledging the fact that
women receive unequal material treatment and pursuing legal means of equality address
only a symptom of the disease plaguing this culture.
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While I commend liberal feminism and share a similar political platform, I must
admit their approach leaves me unsatisfied. My limited agreement with liberal feminism
is the active pursuit of changing the system through such regulations as Title IX.
However, simply attempting to alter the legal actuality of discrimination against women
does not touch on the conceptual problem. An entertaining and insightful anecdote will
help express how my eyes were opened to the much more serious problem. Throughout
my career as an athlete I thought that if we women had the same opportunities, money,
and equipment we would be equal. Yet, even after Title IX was initiated I came to realize
the problem ran much deeper. Why didnt we have the same funding and why was our
request met with such hostility?  Because there was a deep seated disrespect and disgust
toward womens sports by men. We were intruding on an area that men had dominated
for so long, which was (allegedly) necessarily masculine because it required competition.
My position was changed or directed to the root of the problem not the symptoms
(unequal funding). On one sunny summer afternoon my sister, Kasey, and I lay on the
cool outfield grass of our local softball field basking in the glory of our recent win. We
began talking about discrimination of women's athletics and our anger guided us to look
at the issue as a problem of values and respect (which men seemed to be lacking). The
fruit of our discussion was the following short essay. Although I would love to take credit
for it, the prose it is not mine, but Kaseys. Yet, I like to think I did have some influence
since our conversation that afternoon inspired her essay entitled Heart.
No, women will never be equal. We will never run as fast or jump as high or
throw as hard as you. We will never have the same kind of fame, make as much money, or
get as much respect. But you know, we still try. Every day we step onto the field or the
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court knowing that even if we work twice as hard as you do we can only be your worst.
And you laugh. But we still play. We play knowing that even if the score says we are
ahead at the end of the game, we will still have lost. We play a game we can never win.
And we play it everyday of our lives. We play knowing that we will only be good for a
girl.  We play knowing that while we are pouring blood, sweat, and tears into our game,
you are somewhere laughing. We play a losing game. A game where you make the rules
and hire the referees. What we do takes more heart than you can ever comprehend, even
in the last moment of a championship game. Why do you play?  You play striving to be
the best because you can be. Can you comprehend the notion that we can work twenty-
four hours a day and still never be the best?  Do you know how it feels to know that no
matter how many wins you have at the end of a season, you will still never be winners?
How would it feel to know that you can never win?  Never. But how much heart does it
take to keep playing?  How much heart does it take to be beaten everyday and still be
proud?  You give credit to the unfortunate ones who arent blessed with talent, but try.
You hold your hand out to the handicapped child who will never win a race. You hold his
hand and you cheer for him, and when he comes in his inevitable last, you pat him on the
back and tell him great job.  And you look at him, and you respect him for trying. You
speak up for him because you realize how much heart it takes to keep attempting to
succeed at an all-impossible task. So why not us?  We go through that battle everyday.
We step on the field or the court knowing that we cannot win. But we still play. Isnt that
worthy of a little respect?  You mock our efforts in jokes and teasing. But whats so
funny?  What you are mocking is our determination. You are laughing because you know
we will never win, but keep trying. You are mocking the very thing you respected the
handicapped child for. It's pretty funny, huh?  We may not be able to teach you how to
jump or throw, but we can teach you heart. You may not respect us for our quickness or
our strength, but you should respect us for our heart. Can you understand waking up
every morning with something to prove?  Can you understand going to bed every night
knowing that you have lost?  Can you understand playing a game where you can never
win?  You probably can't, and that's O.K. But you can understand that we do, and that we
still play. And for that, you can look at us and you can say, "great job."
The domination of women by men lies not in the physical, but in the conceptual
ideals of what it is to be human and its expression through our roles and participation in
this world. As noted above, Woolf demands two components for the success and equality
of women in writing; money and rooms of their own. In high school and collegiate
athletics, Title IX has provided women with monetary compensation. While this
component is by no means sufficiently met, it has received redress and is of less
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significance today than the latter component:  A room of one's own is more important.
What exactly does Woolf have in mind here?
Literally, one may take the phrase to mean privacy and possession. However,
philosophical exploration demands more. "Room" functions metaphorically in Woolf's
novel, A Room of One's Own, as well as in its adaptation here. Her novel, as analyzed by
Joel Rich, is a cultural odyssey where we experience someone (namely a woman) moving
past landmarks toward a settled place or a settled opinion.2
My goal is to explore territory that has traditionally been masculine and to present
an alternative narrative. Thus, I too am setting out on a journey through the choppy
waters of women and sport. While it is easy to be lured into the security of such definitive
terms as good and bad, when dealing with oppression, this journey is far more
complicated. Thus, "room" serves as a tool, to guide us into this "territory" known as
sport.
I have chosen Australian philosopher Val Plumwoods critical ecological feminist
theory to investigate and expose the blatant masculinity imposed upon sport, which is
used to perpetuate the exclusion of women. Following this investigation, I argue that
sport is an arena, perhaps historically created and participated in by men, but that it does
not require solely masculine characteristics in which to participate, nor should women
who possess such characteristics be considered any less female.
Before beginning my analysis of sport, a summary of Plumwood's argument
drawn from her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature is useful. Plumwood launches
into an ecofeminist philosophy by way of other classic scholars such as Rosemary
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Radford Ruether and Carolyn Merchant. All assert that there have been historically, and
today, crucial conceptual connections between women and nature. Understanding how
these connections are constructed is necessary to understanding how each is oppressed
and how we must rethink each category in order to create a new definition and
understanding of humanity. Plumwood sees the oppression of women and nature as a
result of being on the losing side of a dualism. She sees these dualisms as composing a
playing board for the game of oppression. Or in her words, an overarching dualistic
schema representing at the level of concept formation the basic colonizing dynamic of








We have come to understand our world through dualisms in which there is a dominator
and a dominated or in athletic terms a winner and a loser.
Historically, this way of understanding and conceiving the world has gone
unchallenged. Plumwood emphatically rejects this meta-narrative on the grounds that it
inadequately considers the values of all life forms and ways of life. Furthermore, she
offers an alternative narrative that she believes functions better at the individual, social,
and political levels. This critical alternative is intended not only to rethink the concept of
women, but also the concept of human being, so as to include women in humanity. This
far extends her predecessors work in fields such as liberal and radical feminism, who
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neglect to challenge the overarching dualistic schema and instead work to adapt to it or
reverse the roles so that women become the dominator. More specifically, radical
feminism is concerned with sexuality. It argues that the fundamental causes of women's
oppression are sexual. Due to women's reproductive role they are subordinated. Liberal
feminism argues from a political platform. Women have the same rights as men; thus
society must provide women with the same educational and occupational opportunities
that men have. Plumwood, however, is quick to point out that this liberal feminism does
not eliminate the problem, but manipulates it in the favor of women.
We must understand that Plumwoods attack is on dualism, not on distinctions or
dichotomies. She sees distinctions and dichotomies as necessary to life. The crucial
difference is that dualisms provide a means and justification for methodically
categorizing and constructing the world through hierarchical relationships. As she
eloquently puts it, In dualistic construction, as in hierarchy, the qualities (actual or
supposed), the culture, the values and the areas of life associated with the dualised other
are systematically and pervasively constructed and depicted as inferior.4  The term
dualistic as I use it here is a relation of separation and domination, which is deeply
embedded in culture and rationalized as natural. The key to understanding dualism,
according to Plumwood, and how they apply to sport requires identifying five
characteristics:  backgrounding, radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalism, and
homogenization. These five form the logical structure of dualistic thinking. They are best
understood as features of the relationship between the members of the contrasting pairs in
the dualism.
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The first of the five features Plumwood calls backgrounding or denial. It is a
complex feature resulting from the masters (dominators) struggle to reconcile his own
self-aggrandized independence with a dependency on the other (dominated). This denial
makes the other inessential, denying the other's contribution to the masters reality, and
instilling a hierarchy of activities. This denial is evident from the fact that many activities
performed by women do not fall near the top of the hierarchy, and hence are simply
considered not worth noticing. These activities include housework, gardening, raising
children, grocery shopping, etc. Yet, it is these very activities, which, considered
frivolous and unworthy of attention, provide the conditions necessary for the activities in
which the master participates.
Backgrounding allows for radical exclusion, the second feature in the relationship.
The other is treated not merely different but inferior, part of a lower, different order of
being, differentiation from it demands not merely distinctions, but radical exclusion, not
merely separation but hyperseperation.5  Radical exclusion is used to maintain a pristine
identity completely distinct from the other. An example derived directly from sport of
such an exclusion is in the area of strength and virility. The man considers himself
excluded from women due to the obvious anatomical differences and biological features
that result in the former's perception of superiority. He may say to himself, I am nothing
like the other because I am stronger and can lift more or throw harder or run faster.  It is
especially in respect to these biological differences that men feel they are naturally
justified in their hypersepartion.
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Incorporation, the third feature, is important because it reveals how the
dualistically construed opposites affect the other. The inferior individual within the
relationship is defined not in original terms, but only in respect to the superior.
Furthermore, the other is always construed as negative or lacking a characteristic
possessed by the master. Simone de Beauvoir writes that humanity is male and man
defines women not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous
being...she is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference
to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject,
he is the Absolute she is the Other.6  One could logically symbolize the master as P and
the other as ~P. While both depend upon each other for meaning and identity, they lack
equality. The masters qualities are primary, wherein his power lies. It is clear from the
logical example that the other does not stand alone, but is consumed by the master by
way of opposition. The other is in fact defined in terms of the master. It is this point in
particular that works its way most powerfully into Plumwoods thesis. Plumwood
believes that in the same way that the other, for our purposes women, is defined in terms
of the man, human is also defined in masculine characteristics.
The fourth feature is instrumentalism (objectification). Instrumentalism and
objectification are used synonymously because when women are viewed as object, sexual
or otherwise, they become a means and are no longer seen as ends in themselves. They
are objects to be utilized by another, instruments to be directed. The previous three
characteristics have revealed a superior or higher to inferior or lower order. In accordance
with this characteristic, the lower order is useful or instrumental in meeting the ends of
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the superior order. They are made part of a network of purposes which are defined in
terms of or harnessed to the masters purposes and needs.7  In other words, women are
simply resources and/or tools used by men. They are not seen to have any interests of
their own, and are thereby easily objectified.
This objectification through instrumentalism festers into homogenization or
stereotyping, the fifth feature. This process allows the dominator to disregard the
differences among the dominated and to treat them all as though they conform to a single
standard. Due to the masters self-affirming centrality, the differences found among those
inferiors are of little significance. They are colonized (all made to be the same and easily
organized into groups) by the master into perfect groups at the mercy of their superior.
These five features, Plumwood believes, work together to enforce an imposed
conceptual framework, which divides beings into two orders. Plumwood argues that men
and women can be conceptualized and treated in more integrated and unified ways.8
Again I stress that she is not denying differences among men and women, but simply
challenging the current arrangement of difference which grounds hierarchy.
Even with a verbal and written acknowledgement of the problematic dualism,
daily effort is required in the battle, to overcome and dismantle these relationships and
recreate a relationship and identity free of hierarchical conception of difference.
Plumwood believes that we must all acknowledge our dependency upon one another for
survival and identity in this world. Furthermore, our differences need not function as
catalysts for separation and oppression, but could serve to foster curiosity, awe, and an
appreciation of diversity.
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This critical ecological feminism, although not directly related to sport, may be
employed in order to shed light on the discrimination women have long since suffered. I
apply Plumwoods theory to sport because I have a vested interest in my being a woman
and an athlete. Nevertheless, my investigation is not limited solely to my personal
interest. Sport has not been given the academic attention it deserves and is often
dismissed as an extracurricular activity not centrally associated with social and culture
values or patterns. To the contrary, I argue that organized sport is an arena of constant
struggle over basic social conceptions of men and women and of ideological contests in
terms of power. As Clarke and Clarke argue, sport appears as a sphere of activity
outside society and particularly as it appears to involve nature, physical skills and
capacities, [sport] presents these ideological images as if they were natural.9  Hence,
sport is a powerful cultural arena for the perpetuation of the ideology of male superiority
and domination.
Because the very definition of sport is written in masculine terms, sport is an
opportunity to apply Plumwoods theory. I believe she would argue that her dualistic
relational features are easily identified in sport and change is possible in sport despite
past dismissals by other feminists. Sport has been successfully feminist free in
comparison to many other societal arenas because it presents a problem. To compete in
sport and fight for equal participation for women appears to promote dominant male
values. More specifically, the values often associated with sport are competition,
aggression, physical contact, strategy, and deception tend to be posited in opposition to
compassion, reciprocity, timidity, compliance. This list of values is the terms that tend to
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define sport. Furthermore, the former values are historically attached to men and the
latter to women, thus creating ideal concepts that very real people must meet. Yet, as I
argue below, an adoption of Plumwoods anti-dualisms makes these values androgynous.
A key to understanding the naturalization of women in sport is to avoid past social and
feminist mistakes of essentialism. I mean by "naturalization of women in sport" that they
become comfortable with their own active involvement in a sport or athletic event. In
order for women to be accepted, most importantly by themselves, they must not assume
that what it is to be a women is to have particular and essential characteristics. Moreover,
women in sport are a social anomaly because sport is considered a desirable male
domain. Despite sport's recognition as a superior male activity it cannot be ignored if
women are to understand the process of their domination. Women's own domination
often is the cause of many problems. The insane person is often locked inside himself or
herself and with guidance and discussion he or she can escape. Thus, while I understand
that other individuals often make women feel conceptually different or inferior often
time, it is our own misconception and self-oppression that keeps us constrained. Thus,
women need to recognize that they can escape this process. The absence of women being
the traditional view of sport, Id like to continue by presenting a definition of sport as a
characteristically masculine activity.
According to Lois Bryson, sport is an institution in which male hegemony is
constructed and reconstructed.10  Radical separation is first apparent in the physical realm
of sport. Because sport is body-centered, strength, agility, power, endurance, fitness, etc.
are all qualities that constitute an ideal player. Yet, traditionally these characteristics have
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eluded women who instead were dubbed meek, mild, emotional, etc. It is the requirement
of those male qualities in sports that work to exclude women. Some feminist critics argue
that women in sport challenge the passivity inscribed on womens bodies. They are
thought to transcend their own characteristics and enter the male zone.
Yet, I argue that qualities such as strength, power, endurance, etc. are not essential
characteristics of men, but possessed by both sexes. Through social and cultural
convention women have had little opportunity to demonstrate such androgynous
qualities. Unfortunately, simply entering the domain of the man and demonstrating
similar qualities does not give women equal standing. Such a position is implausible
within a dualistic framework because we are categorically defined as inferior and only
exist in relation to men. Thus, in athletics a womans sexual identity is given precedent
over her sports identity in reaction to her intrusion. This precedence is done through
sexual innuendoes in sports commentary and among the fans and players themselves.
Such a language of discourse as sexually indirect suggestion is an examples of
instrumentalism and objectification. Men cannot let the other come into direct contact
with their identity; therefore, to mentally justify womens forced entrance into the field of
sport they trivialize it. Women continue to be considered sexual objects; although their
bodies may excel in sports, they are still primarily objects of pleasure for men.
Examples of such reactions are apparent in the uniforms of several womens
sports. For example, womens volleyball uniforms, bitterly called butt-huggers by
women are nothing more than a thin, short piece of lycra that has only one direction to
go, up!  I can recall my high school volleyball teams amazingly  large crowd of football
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players despite our losing seasoning. The men were not there to offer support and admire
good performances; they simply enjoyed the view. Gymnastics, tennis, and bodybuilding
are similar with regard to the ornamentation of the female body. Granted some men's
athletics objectify the body as well. Thus, the objectification is not limited to a gender
discrimination, but a problem of how society views the purpose and function of sport.
If it is not sexual objectification, then men expend misdirected energy by focusing
on the bizarre nature of women and sport. The oldest evidence of sport dates back to
Greek civilization with little to no female participation. Such a tradition has dominated
most societies. Thus, because of the long time exclusion of women from sport when they
enter the arena it is unexpected. It raises a curious eyebrow much as a palm tree would in
the forests of Oregon. A tone of superiority, humor, or irony is found in mens voices and
comments with respect to women. As Dr. Johnsons old phrase says, Its like a dog
standing on its hind legs. It is not well done, rather one is surprised to see it attempted at
all.11  This comment again draws attention to the radical separation of the other. Our
society fundamentally believes that men and women must be continuously differentiated.
Sport helps to outline and define the male identity. It is associated with popularity and
friends. Everyone knows the stereotype that the captain of the football team is likely the
most popular person in school. The societal understanding of team sports, such as
football, rugby, and soccer portray men as gregarious, expressive, and often seen living it
up amidst a crowd of fans in the local pub after a match. It is not the sport itself, but the
participants that reinforce this image. Athletic achievement strengthens the male identity.
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It is taken for granted that success in athletic endeavors is not only success at being
masculine, but success  in life.
Professional sports make this concept a reality for a small number of men.
However, only very small portions of male athletes make it to the professional level. For
professional athletes many necessities faced by the rest of us become obsolete and are not
a means to success. For example, intellectual achievement is sacrificed for improvement
on the court or field. However, the tables turn when women enter the picture. A woman
in sport is thought of as alone. There is no popular image of backslapping and high fives.
Instead a female athlete conjures up feelings of distrust because she is a stranger and
disliked because of her marginal location. Furthermore, the more outstanding her
performance the more she is marked as a deviant. Instead of confirming her identity,
success threatens her with a foreign male identity. She lives a life of severe contradiction.
She is trapped in the identity given her by the master and if she tries to adopt his identity
out of supposed equality she finds that it doesnt fit. To add to her confusion and
frustration, not only does she adopt a distorted male identity, but she also no longer meets
the demands of the masters definition of a woman. Thus, to succeed as an athlete is to
fail as a woman because she has in symbolic ways become a man. But she does not enjoy
the anticipated benefits of such a position. In academic terms this is the cause of the
feelings expressed in the essay Heart.
Furthermore, there are two more processes through which sports contribute to the
maintenance of hegemonic masculinity. The first is society's definition of who can
participate in sport. Traditionally, men and children are among the only members of
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sporting activities. When women do enter, men are still in control in terms of
organization, coaches, managers, administrators, and referees, who are usually always
men. Although this misconception exists throughout the entire society, the media
propagates it further.
Second, womens sport is virtually ignored or minimally covered. The media is
concerned almost solely with mens sport. You might find a womens fastpitch softball
game televised on ESPN2 at three oclock Saturday morning. But men get primetime
network slots. Nevertheless, when women do compete against men in some sports, the
latter's performance is equal to or even superior to that of men. For example, endurance
sports, such as swimming, have proven women champions. Finally, down goes the wall
that men have built and continuously fortified and hid behind, physical superiority. For
example, in Challenging the Men, impressive records of women swimmers are
recognized:  Two of the fastest times in Lake Windemere are held by women, eight of
the ten fastest English Channel swims in either direction and the non-stop record each
way are held by women; and the each way and both way records for Catalina Channel
Swims are held by women.12  Therefore, it matters not if women win or lose in sport;
they go unrecognized. The final process of maintaining the hegemonic masculinity is the
trivialization of sports for women. This ranges from prohibiting women to coach men to
the motherly appearance. For example, a newspaper article featured a photo of Rosemary
Longstaff, training for a marathon behind a stroller and the caption read Marathon mum
is pushing off to London.13
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With such animosity directed toward women, it is a wonder that we keep trying.
But our move into sport is a need for equality and control of our own bodies. More
importantly it is a need for self-definition, which challenges the ideological basis of male
domination. I applaud womens perseverance despite mens resistance. A resistance that
is driven by the desire to maintain sport as a socializing agency,  the maintenance of
hierarchical ranking of sex roles, a preservation of the male realm that allows for
expressiveness and intimacy (qualities that are typically absent from what is generally
viewed as appropriate behavior for men).14
The solution to this problem requires a conceptual revolution. Men and women
must both realize that although they possess both similar and different qualities, none are
essential to their gender identity. Women may be competitive and passive. Likewise men
can be strong and cry. While I do not attempt to describe how a human should be defined
without masculine or feminine overtones, I do wish to offer six points, taken from Susan
Birrell and Diana M. Richter's article "Is a Diamond Forever," that we can employ to
make sport the domain of both sexes equally. First, winning is over emphasized at the
expense of individual and team enjoyment. The primacy of winning is voiced in feminist
literature and I too conclude this is the wrong emphasis when one conceives of sport. One
should refuse to allow winning the privilege of ultimate worth. The joy of playing is often
sacrificed for the win. With such an importance placed on winning the division between
play and life becomes less structured (this will be explained at length in chapter two).
One should desire to play a highly skilled game, which continues to incorporate hard play
and fun play. Second, with connection to this overemphasis, the hierarchical nature of
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sports needs to undergo modification in reference to players and coaches. Male coaches
often use the scare tactic as a motivator. Loosely veiled threats by coaches clearly
demonstrate the power struggle.  The third point, elitism based on skill, deserves careful
deliberation. While I do not feel that categorizing players, male or female, into skill
groups is wrong, I do find the grossly exaggerated attention to the best of the best
tiresome. Sport is not about simply winning or holding a record. Skills such as teamwork,
self-discipline, inspiration, comradery, and many more present themselves in sport. By
focusing solely on the elite in skill these other qualities are ignored or disregarded to the
detriment of society. Furthermore, the concern with skill does not allow for health and
reciprocal relationship in the event of an "off day."  At some point in one's athletic
experience one will perform poorly. This is not a tragedy given that we are human and
prone to physical and mental mistakes. Thus, one must rely on one's team to carry them
through this rough time rather than condemn the act as negative and unacceptable.
Fourth, exclusivity represented by sexism and elitism in sport follow. Each of
these can divide friends and teammates into cliques that perpetuate the greater problem.
Social exclusion works to further isolate women or men in the field of sport. It allows the
individual and the group to create one identity for a person when there are truly many
more variables at work. Fifth, is the disparagement of an opponent that only serves to
alienate players and teams from one another. While a good natured rivalry often adds to
the excitement and momentum of a game, it, like anything else, is taken to the extreme. A
game of sport is not war, but youd be hard pressed to know that in todays society. The
opponent who truly is a comrade and whose presence is necessary to ensure any sort of
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game or competition is mutated into the enemy. Sixth, the ethic of endangerment places
the outcome of the game above the players' safety. This ethic is a derivative of the
winning is everything and win at all costs drive. Sport doesnt have to be the violent
cut-throat business it has become. It can be an activity for activity's sake. It is a field of
simplicity where right and wrong is easily identified based on rules and etiquette. It can
be the ideal expression of unfettered social relations and a start to this new way of
conceptualizing the world without dualisms. Of course, it requires daily practice and a
habit of deliberately denying and ignoring the current dualism in favor of a non-




The previous chapter has outlined the problems women face in sport, which is a
result of dualism. In the next chapter I work to dismantle the aforementioned dualism via
women's participation in wilderness sport. In order to understand wilderness sport
however, it is important to understand the components of sport I outline in this chapter. I
believe one possible avenue is to focus on the intimate connection of sport and self.
However, before such topics can be addressed one must have an understanding of sport
as situated in philosophy. This chapter introduces four key terms common to the
philosophy of sport, play, game, sport, and athletics. Through a new interpretation of
each of these concepts and their interaction, I suggest that women in particular, but men
as well, can recreate the room into a space rich with complexity and multi-variant
achievement.
Sport situated in philosophy
Excellence is a value pursued, but not always found in every human endeavor.
Yet, when encountered, excellence gives way to awe and excitement. Excellence keeps
one coming back for more, a challenge that delights its captive audience. Paul Weiss
writes of excellence, "Illustrating perfection, it gives us a measure for whatever else we
do."15  In fact, both men and women appreciate the concern for excellence. Excellence
exists in many fields, great character, a stature for the art of living, great leaders and
statesmen, teachers of mankind, wise sages, and athletes.16  However, it is evident that
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the excellence seen in the public sector of only a few individuals is not what fuels the
desire for such behavior. Few will attain public excellence, but a private excellence
results from "a mastery of the body or of the things in the world."17  Thus, sport is
introduced as a means to bodily excellence.
Sport, as conceptualized and practiced by the layperson or professional entails the
body. Because this thesis is a collection of philosophical reflections on the subject, one
may question if sport indeed has any philosophical import. Philosophers are only recently
beginning to give sport the academic attention it deserves. Weiss recognizes that sport
has traditionally been slighted along with other areas (now gaining credibility) such as
sex, work, and play. The nature and desire of humans to achieve pleasure have occupied
the bulk of philosophical musings.18  For example, political philosophy and ethical
theories focus on the nature of humans as well as their desire to achieve those entities,
positions, or otherwise which grant them pleasure. Pleasure includes the idea of
excellence and the desire for it, along with the understanding that people everywhere are
people with similar natures and appetites.19  However, such thoughts have not led
philosophy down the road to sport.
Despite philosophy's snubbing of an arena that truly is one of the "most universal
occupations of men," it is not without some ancient attention.20  The Greeks provide us
with some explanation for the neglect of sport. Certainly the Greek people enjoyed
athletics, but their delight was limited to spectatorship, not extensive thought of the
nature of or reason for sport. According to Weiss, it was Plato and his fellow
philosophers who set the precedent for casting aside sport in favor of other issues. Since
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Plato and the Greeks assumed a normative position in Western thought, few if any
philosophers have picked sport up throughout the years, that is, until recently. However, I
believe sport provides an excellent realm for understanding the self because the
participation in and reflection of sport are not limited to an elite group of people as much
of philosophy tends to be. It is sport that catches the eye of the young and old, men and
women, wise and foolish, educated and uneducated.21  Furthermore, P. S. Frederickson
observes: "There is no society known to man which does not have games of the sort in
which individuals set up purely artificial obstacles and get satisfaction from overcoming
them."22  Sport may indeed shed light on a common driving human need enabling one to
understand the self as expressed through the pursuit of excellence. My aim here is to
make sport of philosophical interest as it relates to human beings' basic desires.
Importance of sport to society
Sport is comprised of two parts, agon and competition. These can be argued as
aspects of human existence and experience as well, according to Joseph C. Mihalich.
Agon characterizes our hopes and enlivens our dreams, and defines the human spirit in
the quest for satisfaction and the achievement of excellence.23  Competition, like agon,
is found in all aspects of life. The relevancy of sport in theory and practice is today, as in
the past, a clear influence on our lives.
In fact, Robert L. Simon, a sports philosopher, supplies the statistical information
that 96.3 percent of American population plays or watches or reads articles about sports
with some frequency or identifies with particular teams or players.24  With such a large
audience following sports, it is certainly a reflection of some commonality between
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humans. What really is of value in sports to this audience?  Is it just the sport or the
fanfare, money, violence, and excitement?  Simon compares todays audience with
ancient Greeks, Romans, and Native Americans. Sports were valued greatly in all these
societies, through participation in sports, and the related activity of play, the individual
gained characteristics of human society.25  Yet, what is commonly unknown about the
Greeks is that they were concerned only with winning.26  It was the British who brought
in the idea of a need for how the game was played.27  They believed that what we gain
from losing makes us better winners. Sport is also an institutionalized game with a
history, a body of rules, winners and losers, and outcomes based on physical prowess.28
They are viewed as leisure pursuits that reflect and reinforce social values and normative
boundaries. Sport is a way of instilling conformity, teaching social rules and respect for
rules, teamwork, cooperation, perseverance, sportsmanship, and fair play.
Sport is made possible by a suspension of several informal norms such as: age,
gender, behavior, and appearance. In terms of age, it is thought that adults shouldnt
spend all their time playing games, but instead find a job and support their family
maturely. Yet, for professional athletes, playing a game is their career. Gender behavior
is also suspended because in the context of sport males may show emotion and have
physical contact. Their behavior is also different, because they can now do things they
could not in other areas of their lives. For example, snuff chewing, spitting, swearing,
screaming, and trash talking are normally considered rude, but accepted within sport.
The appearances of the fans by painting their faces and wearing team colors or tattoos
represents some suspension of norms as well. It is by way of this suspension that
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conditions are met, allowing one to know the self. No longer are they burdened by
traditional external norms. This is the play side of Sartre's play/serious separation in
"Play and Sport."29
In essence, sport partitions off a part of the world that one can control. Rules are
created arbitrarily by the participants based on a long history or of spontaneous creation,
and these rules are followed only as long as desired. The serious aspect of life disappears
within the realm of sport. Sartre argues that when rules are created, one has a sense of
freedom because within this context one can change those rules or opt not to participate.
Opposed to play is seriousness. Sartre describes seriousness as placing meaning in the
world. This seriousness then allows one to sacrifice parts of one's life or self. The locus
of inquiry is no longer on the self. Fundamentally, play involves and revolves around the
self. Play asks how one comports oneself. Furthermore, play is foundationally the desire
to be. Within the context or framework of play, the field or playground does something.
The participant constructs it. The structure changes. Sartre uses the example of snow.
While hiking up the mountain covered in snow, one struggles through the white cold
substance. The ground breaks under one's weight. However, on the way down the
mountain the structure of the snow is essentially changed. Now, it supports one's weight
and in fact proves to be a surface slippery and ready to push you up to meet the blue sky
above. Thus, environment plays a key role in play and the interaction of the player.
Language of sport: play, game, sport, and athletics
The problem women face in sport is largely a result of the conceptual ideal of
sport as well as its derivatives. In order for women to overcome the oppression they face,
27
from male counterpart as well as a woman's self-imposition stemming from socialization,
a new concept of sport must take hold. I suggest this new concept should be sought
through a reconstruction of how sport is characteristically and semantically defined.
James Keating believes that society has a problem with the language of sport as well as
its definitional characteristics. The language is obscure and ambiguous. The words, play,
game, sport, and athletics are all used interchangeably by much of the population, when
in fact he believes there is a great difference between them. His main concern is that
sport is a synonym for athletics. Consider the example of Sports Illustrated. They
endorsed an activity that called for a single month moratorium on sport. They were to do
have nothing to do with sports at all. Why?  So the employees could get a chance to get
caught up on their golf, football, softball, jogging, fishing, etc. Yet, these are all sporting
activities.
Play
Philosophers of sport disagree on the definition, purpose, and role of play, game,
sport, and athletics. However, the relationship between these four words that do represent
activities is necessary in understanding how the self emerges and is understood.
Prominent philosophers in the field of sport such as Kretchmar, Weiss, Slusher, and
Vanderzwaag believe each of these activities is distinct from the other. Play tends to
receive the least amount of attention because it functions rather simplistically. While
Slusher believes play is the raw material of sport he doesn't offer isolated characteristics
for such a material. Kretchmar, on the other hand, identifies the chief characteristics of
play. He argues that play is unimportant in terms of the effects or result following the
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doing of play. What is important is one's love of doing, the possibility of participating in
the experience in the spirit of play.30  Play is only made possible by one, prerationality
and two, free choice. Prerationality is the absence of calculations, thus entailing the
correlative aspect of spontaneity.31  In this sense play is for the lover who willingly gives
himself or herself to his or her playground, equipment, and playmate. However,
Kretchmar points out this often results in losing track of time, missing dinner, and
engaging in silly activity all for the sake of the experience. Play can be rather addictive in
this regard because it does carry an intoxicating momentum. Play is also a freely chosen
activity with the burden of duty, fear, courage, or self-sacrifice as motivations. A person
is invited to do (play) by the world that they find interesting. Doing so of course, may
result is good or bad consequences; yet, these aren't premeditated nor do they factor into
the intention of play.
Weiss develops a similar definition of play; however, he is much more focused on
the social aspect. Clearly, play is the primary occupation of children. One doesn't have to
look further than a school playground to find examples of play. Whether it is rope
jumping, tag, leapfrog, or mud puddle splashing, the spirit of camaraderie is present.
Weiss argues that play is "nature's way of turning barbarians into socially acceptable
beings.32  Play becomes a socializing agent that maximizes participation in group
activities, but also gives way to maturity. Weiss points out that children play with each
other and in their absence they will play with adults, pets, and even imaginary friends.
Thus, play appears necessary to a child's development. However, while play may be an
active agent in allowing one to reach maturity, it then becomes an awkward and often
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times laborious task. This characterization quite obviously contradicts the original
characteristics described by Kretchmar. Adults do not engage in play as readily as
children and often require work in doing so.
Vanderzwaag adds one vital component to the definition of play. Drawing from J.
C. Friedrich von Schiller's work, he argues that play is valuable for man's potential in
life.33  Initially, he concludes play is valuable because it is often contrasted with work.
Both are necessary for the activity we call life. The latter provides us with subsistence,
shelter, and creature comforts. The former allows us to escape the world of work, which
has the baggage of stress, seriousness, and finality. Yet, play is a world of our creation
that we can enter and leave at any time; it enables one to keep one's sanity in a matter of
speaking. However, I do not agree with von Schiller's contrast and like Vanderzwaag I
believe play and work should be viewed in a continuum rather than at odds. If we place
work at one end and play at the other, we are able to slide through this continuum much
like the weights on a scale. This conception better characterizes one's experience of play
and work because often the two are intermingled. Many people find their work quite
enjoyable and might very well equate it with playing.
Roger Caillois rounds out the definition of play with his focus again on the
freedom of the individual. Play is free because it depends solely on the individual to
begin and to terminate the activity.34  Thus, it is necessary that play is freely accepted and
carried out by the individual only as long as he or she desires it. One engages in play by
way of phenomenological methods. In order to play one must bracket activities of daily
life and enter a more controlled world. Thus, control becomes an issue and play exists
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when the individual is in charge by way of reinterpreting what objects are and what they
do.35  Control allows one to create a tighter world for oneself where one can relax
because it is self-structured. The individual is not subjected to the loosely structured and
necessarily uncontrollable world at large. Thus, Caillois is implementing
phenomenology's technique of bracketing. What exactly is controlled in play?  According
to Caillois, portions of time, space, and causality are demarcated with subordinate areas
and activities left open to spontaneity and free interpretation, which are controlled. This
is an extension of Kretchmar's definition of play. Most importantly play allows one to
recognize boundaries in particular, where one stops and the world begins. It is this
characteristic that differs significantly from games and sport according to Weiss.36
Game
The word game means, "to leap joyously."37  How is this word different from
play, one may ask?  Because it is an activity the key is "leaping;" a game is a challenge of
the body. Game incorporates many characteristics of play, most importantly the voluntary
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Games range in difficulty level, but a
problem always exists. Contrary to its traditional connotation, the problem functions as a
positive aspect of games. It presents a challenge to the participant. Kretchmar argues that
the presence of "inefficient means" also comprises all games.38  For example, the game of
golf requires that the little white ball be placed in the hole. The most efficient means of
achieving this goal is to walk to the flag, ball in hand, and to place it in the hole.
However, there is very little challenge in this method. Yet, the presence of an inefficient
means is not a sufficient basis for concluding that something is a game, according to
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Kretchmar.39  Morality and ethical theories can fall under this category and surly they are
not games. Thus, a second component is necessary.
It is the voluntary acceptance of limited means. The underlying assumption here
is that it is the pursuit that is important, not simply winning. It requires taking longer
routes to have the experience of trying to reach the goal and overcome the challenge. The
third and final component is the adoption of a serious attitude. This attitude should not be
confused with Sartre's concept of seriousness. Kretchmar is arguing that one's attitude
and approach to the game is that of a serious desire to succeed. Thus, games are only
meaningful when taken seriously in the sense of interest and commitment.40  In short,
games involve problem solving and according to Kretchmar may be experienced as play
or not.
Weiss takes a similar, but slightly different approach to game. He argues that
strategy, tactics, and reflections define it. It is, however, different from sport and athletics
because the actual competing athlete acts without reflection of the problem.41  The athlete
doesn't consider the consequences of his action outside the game. For example, a baseball
player running home intending to put his or her shoulder into the catcher in an attempt to
dislodge the ball from the catchers mitt doesn't reflect on the fact this is intentional
assault. The aim is simply not to be tagged out. Furthermore, games require conformity to
rules or the locus of ideal play. Yet, Weiss strays from Kretchmar and other philosophers
of sport when he claims games are not bound off or bracketed from ordinary life. On the
other hand, a game is a very serious endeavor requiring continuation. It must run its
course and remain going despite tiredness and the lure of other activities, submission to
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rules, or physical exertion. While Weiss and Kretchmar disagree sharply on the
seriousness aspect, I believe each has a valid point, and are compatible in wilderness
sport. However, before any conclusions are drawn, two more concepts need exploration:
sport and athletics.
Sport and Athletics
  The last two categorizes needing explanation and investigations are sport and
athletics. Keating wants to clarify the difference between sport and athletics because
sport is too loosely applied to human behavior. He argues that sport is a diversion for
one's amusement. Sport, we are told, is an abbreviation of the Middle English word
desport or disport, themselves a derivative of the Old French verb desporter, which
literally means to carry away from work.42  Work here is best understood as the serious
aspect of Sartre's description. Webster indicates that it is a diversion or recreation and
past time. Athletics, on the other hand, is a competitive game in which the prize or
victory is important. Keating believes that athletes are prizefighters by nature. Athletics is
a contest in which the playful spirit is absent and the prime purpose of the participants is
victory in the contest. This is not the case in sport. Sport has a playful spirit; one tries to
win, but if he or she doesnt, it is fine as long as the game itself is enjoyable.
These two categories arent different in terms of their mechanics or rules, only in
preparation and intention. Keating believes that sport is a diversion. Athletics is a
competitive activity, which ends in victory or defeat and is characterized by the spirit of
dedication, sacrifice, and intensity. Sportsmanship plays an important role in society,
but Keating believes that an attempt to make sportsmanship an all-embracing moral
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category is impossible when comparing sport and athletics. In 1926 a national
Sportsmanship Brotherhood was organized to spread the beliefs of sportsmanship in all
aspect of life. Its code consists of eight rules: keep the rule, keep faith with your
comrades, keep yourself fit, keep your temper, keep your play free from brutality, keep
pride under controlling victory, keep stout in defeat, keep a sound soul and a clean mind
in a healthy body. Each of these can also be emphasized in society in exclusion of sport,
but as we see they can also be absent from both society and sport. Keating has a different
idea of the essence of genuine sportsmanship. He argues it is not merely an aggregate of
moral qualities comprising a code of specialized behavior, but also an attitude, posture,
and manner of interpreting what would otherwise be only a legal code. Many qualities
that have characterized the sportsman in the past include: Truthfulness, courage, spartan,
endurance, self-control, self-respect, consideration one for anothers opinions and right,
courtesy, fairness, magnanimity, a high sense of honor, co-operation, generosity.43  Yet,
Keating believes that we should not be concerned with those virtues, which might be
found in the sportsman nor in the virtues that often accompany the sportsman, but the
concern is with those moral habits that are essential, and characterize the participant as a
sportsman. He asserts that there are a few key qualities and other peripheral ones. He
reaches this conclusion on the principle that the nature of the activity determines the
conduct and attitudes proper to it. Therefore, there should be a different code of conduct
for sport than athletics because they are by nature different activities
In sport, the primary purpose is not to win, but to have fun. Generosity and
magnanimity are also essential as well as the establishment and maintenance of a social
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bond. The sportsman adopts a cavalier attitude. He or she is self-sacrificing, and not on a
search of legal justice. Nor is he or she trying to evade the rules; he or she acts only from
unquestionable moral right. Sport is a co-operative endeavor to maximize pleasure of joy
from the activity itself. Therefore, the qualities of the sportsman will be geared to this
end. Athletics and its code of conduct are a big leap from sport. Co-operation is no longer
the goal. The objective of an athlete is exclusive possession. Two people or teams cant
share the same victory, and as a result competition and its problems are evident.
Sportsman behavior to an athlete places certain limitations on the rigor of competition.
Yet, in real-life, competition is condoned much as in the struggles of economics, politics,
and international relations, Keating believes. Therefore, he holds that a code that tries to
mitigate the force of competitive confluence is also desirable in athletics. Although, the
athlete is really a prizefighter, he or she also seeks to demonstrate his or her excellence in
a contest that is governed by rules, which acknowledge human worth and dignity.
Looking back at sport, since the sportsmans primary object is enjoyment of the game, he
or she puts great emphasis on the importance of winning. It is easy for him or her to be
modest in victory or gracious in defeat and play fair all the time. Yet, the paradox of
sportsmanship when applied to athletics is that it asks the athlete, who is locked in a
deadly serious and an emotionally charged situation to act outwardly as if he or she were
engaged in some pleasant diversion. Athletes train and sacrifice for weeks and months
and years and after he or she has dreamed of victory and exhausted him or herself
physically, emotionally, and mentally, it is not fair to ask him or her to act fairly in the
contest, modest in victory, and admirable in defeat. Yet, this is the demand that
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sportsmanship makes on the athlete. For this reason, Keating doesnt think equality is
important; nor should it constrain athletics. Any suggestion that fair play obliges him [or
her] to maintain equality in the contest ignores the very nature of athletics.44  He would
agree that modest in victory and composure in defeat testify an admirable and very self-
controlled athlete, but should not be required by society or seen as morally necessary.
Another issue regarding sport and athletics is the idea of winning and the
"attainment of excellence."  How do we determine what attainment of excellence is?  Is it
through victory in accordance with the rules?  Father Hesburgh argues that the excellence
is in the performance and spirit and will to win, not the actually outcome. There is no
necessary connection between excellence and victory. Pope Pius XII holds this view as
well. He thinks there can be excellence in competitive engagement without victory.
Grantland Rice and Baron Pierre de Coubertin also have similar beliefs. De Coubertin
says, The main issue in life is not the victory but the fight; the essential thing is not to
have won, but to have fought well.45  Yet, Keating disagrees and uses the views of
Adolph Rupp and Forest Evashevshi to help describe his view. Evashevshi argues that the
idea of how one plays the game is inferior to the outcome. Thus, winning or losing is the
primary concern. He likens it to surgery, saying that it isnt if the patient lives or dies, but
it is how the surgeon makes the incision. This idea is applied mostly to athletics in
Keatings view, since sport does not focus on winning or losing, but pure enjoyment of
the game. Keating would agree that excellence within athletics is based on victory
because this is the goal of the athlete and he or she is not satisfied unless he or she feels
the exhilaration of victory and know all his or her work and effort has paid off. Some
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argue that there is value in saying, I did my best and thats all I can do.46  Yet, Keating
believes this is a source of either self-satisfaction or consolation. He wonders how one
can be sure he or she really did his or her best. He or she would have to know and accept
his or her limits before the contest even began. Keating believes a true athlete sets no
limits on himself or herself and must never admit to his or her limitations; instead he or
she must be painfully convinced of them. In this regard the idea of doing your best is seen
as a consolation and something said to make losers feel better because there is great
agony in defeat.
Keatings argument is based on the idea that life is categorized or organized into
different realms, each requiring different modes of comportment and we must understand
this and organize our moral behavior accordingly. The behavior is dictated by the end
goal and there is no characteristic of virtue that must be necessarily carried throughout
every situation, thus Keating argues there is a distinction between sport and athletics. It
would appear that perhaps he sees self-interest or self-preservation as justified and a good
thing in economy, politics, and especially athletics. Yet, in sport there are other factors
and the participants are under certain pretenses of enjoyment. The purpose of the activity,
sport, is to enjoy oneself. In athletics the players are under a different set of pretenses and
to form a unified and all-encompassing code of conduct is unjustified and scarifies the
ends of both activities for the means, sportsmanship.
Philosophers of sport want to recognize difference in particular between sport and
athletics, but this demarcation of sport and athletics is incorrect and instead is a
progression. While each of these has different characteristics, they are layers to be
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analyzed much in the same way Lawrence Kolhberg and Carol Gilligan's model of moral
reasoning has different stages. Kolhberg and Gilligan argue that people learn moral
reasoning, and this process is understood in three stages. The preconventional stage of
moral reasoning is primarily egoistic and a matter of satisfying one's own needs. One
then progresses to the conventional stage in which the individual is concerned with
pleasing others and respecting social rules.47  Finally, one should progress into the final
stage of moral reasoning, postconventional.48  This stage is that of principled reasoning.
Thus, just as moral reasoning builds off each previous stage so do the four concepts of
play, game, sport, and athletic. Play is the raw material of games, which make up a sport,
which can be an athletic event. Furthermore, competition and the urge to reach an
outcome (mostly) desirable do not taint the act itself. Competition exists at all levels. It is
a matter of degree that changes and it is how that change affects the individual that may
or may not become problematic.
My attempt at rethinking the idea of the language of sport is to provide a new
realm or space that women can find comfortable. The old idea of sport was a linear
situation given only two polar opposites as its goal and result, winning and losing.
Furthermore, these polar opposites were grounded in competition. However, upon a
critical examination of play, game, sport, and athletics I believe that sport may be viewed
more dynamically and that success at such an activity is not measured simply by victory.
Women no doubt are considered the other in sport by men and themselves. In this
respect, oppression is also imposed , requiring an alternative response. There are certainly
many ways to deal with oppression. In other words, things that the other may do in
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response to imperial power. One could sell out and join the ranks of the oppressor in an
attempt to no longer remain the other, thus becoming an apologist for the status quo. One
may go into hiding and put forth a false face, while preserving the self to some extent. A
violent revolt is yet another response. However, the response I am working toward with a
new concept of sport is to create another world. In essence the other takes up a new
residence in a different and non-oppressive, non-imperialist world, in a different story.
This creation is an active stepping aside from the prevailing world to begin building an
alternative that will preserve the world, cure alienation, further enlivening relationship
with others of all backgrounds.49  This response requires nonviolence, an active
acknowledgement of the other in its own right, and the need for the continuous creation
of the world. I believe such a means of dealing with oppression functions well in sport by
recreating the world in which we choose to live. Yet, this process is not complete unless a
new conception of the self emerges with this New World. To answer this question I again




In this age of palm pilots, video-phones, and the internet, all invented in order to
save us time, the question that presupposes these material objects is: For what are we
saving time?  Undoubtedly, the answers to this question are unlimited: softball, reading,
painting, and enjoying a cocktail with friends. However, each shares one common
denominator, me. I make time for myself. You make time for yourself. Despite the root of
our agreement, we have spent little time (no pun intended) understanding the self,
although we freely use the word as though we had a clear understand of its referent. Take,
for example, the word selfish. Today this word is used to describe one who is
meanspirited. Yet, a study of the derivation of this word reveals much more and opens
the door to Woolf's room. "Ish" generally means "an approximation of," such as
"brownish" or "softish."  Due to the complexity of self as a concept, previous generations
may have coined the term self "ish," thereby giving them leeway.50  Given the fact that
self is unclear, self-understanding becomes very tricky indeed. Kretchmar attempts to
approach this issue by way of a historical analysis of bodies and persons supplemented by
a contemporary doctrine of holism. Before the examination of dualism and holism please
do the following exercise designed by Dr. John M. Charles, which will designate your
current position within the self-study spectrum.
Exercise: Place yourself on the spectrum between each of the paired statements below by
circling the number that identifies your philosophic position:
1. You are body, mind, soul 1  2  3  4  5  You cannot be divided into discrete parts.
2. Education is for the life of the mind 1  2  3  4  5 Education is for the whole being.
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3. Physical education is for a sound mind in a healthy body 1 2 3 4 5 Physical education
     is for well being.
4. You have a body 1  2  3  4  5  You are a body.
5. Basketball free throw shooting is largely mental 1 2 3 4 5 is a concentrated effort.
Analysis: To the extent that language is descriptive, you have displayed the degree of
dualism with which you regard your self. If your score is low [5-10], you tend to view
your body and mind as separate and distinct entities. A high score [20-25] signifies that
you see your self as a unified whole.51
The normal results of this exercise range from 10-20, the middle ground. However, an
individual's score is not the primary focus of this exercise; rather it is the assumption
upon which it is built. Dualism is at the low end of the number spectrum and holism is at
the high end of the number spectrum. In this chapter, I look at these two modes of
thinking about persons, dualistically and holistically. How do we look at bodies?  There
is often variation from person to person. But why is this question important?  Does it
matter how we look at bodies, another's or our own?  Certainly it matters, because it
affects us as people, and, for our purposes, athletes. Our culture in particular makes it
difficult to deal with our bodies in a natural way without any concerns. We run the gamut
of either too much credit (as illustrated on so many magazine covers with reference to
weight control) or too little credit (as illustrated when physical education is first to be cut
from public schools in times of financial difficulty). These questions entail the
recognition of still more; are minds superior to bodies?  What is the difference if minds
and bodies are separate and independent parts of a person or if minds are more valuable
than bodies?52  In order to answer these, and other, questions we must first address what a
person is. Once we've clearly defined a person we can then judge how exercise and sport
can help people.
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This is a question not uncommon in the area of philosophy; in fact, contemporary
philosophers have developed a field with this very question in mind, philosophy of the
mind. However, I would like to look at a person in a more specific arena, that of sport.
Sport incorporates the often forgotten self in the realms of philosophy, the body. It is
generally accepted that the individual self is an "I."  Someone with a unique history who
lives in the present, and projects himself or herself into the future. A person acts, but is
also acted upon; he or she is subject to physical laws.53  Finally, a person is a self-
conscious, intelligent being aware of his or her own existence and capable of
understanding ideas and relationship between ideas. What about personhood?  Kretchmar
defines personhood as "the state or condition of living and experiencing these
qualities."54  Thus, to achieve personhood is to have gained an identity, have a personal
history, generate ideas, and be aware of one's existence.55  What then are bodies, to which
we show such ambivalence?  Again Kretchmar provides a definition accepted in this
field; bodies "are flesh, bones, flood vessels, hands, and feet, the cells in our brains, and
so on."56  Bodies are the sites of all sense perception; hearing, tasting, feeling, seeing,
smelling, which plays a significant role in the phenomenologists' understanding of self.
Because bodies are indeed a material, they are subject to the same constraints of
material substances, namely that they must be located somewhere and must also always
exist at a certain time. In short, bodies are spatially and temporally constrained. However,
this constraint does not limit them from moving or being stationary. In fact, it is the
condition of these constraints that describe embodiment. "Embodiment describes one
fundamental condition of personhood, namely, that humans are always located
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somewhere and sometime and that human consciousness is never free from the influences
of body constrains like chemicals and the number of brain cells in one's head."57    It is
this idea of embodiment on which I would like to focus my attention.
The concept of embodiment requires a person or personhood to incorporate the
body more intimately into the self than traditionally has been the case. One of the earliest
and most notable exclusion of the body from the self comes from Plato. Of course, Plato
is no stranger to the idea of dualism, which is present in both his metaphysics and
epistemology. However, it is the self that concerns this paper. Plato believed in an eternal
soul, which was trapped in the visible world by way of this vessel we call the body. It
was the goal of each individual to step out of the cave and reach the intelligible world of
the Forms. Descartes popularized the dualism between mind and body. However, he left
many unanswered questions in his wake with which modern and postmodern philosophy
still struggle.
The central obstacle standing between our current view of self and Kretchmar's
idea of embodiment is the mind and body. The view of self is the product of one's view of
the relation between body and mind. This relation is what the previous exercise measures.
However, if you found yourself in the low numbers (5-10), you have good reason. While
some of our earliest ancestors were disinterested in a distinction between mind and body,
their views were later supplanted. It was the Greeks who reconceived the mind as an
intangible complement to the temporal body.58  Concurrently, they established a
hierarchy among the two: that the mind is superior to the body. The focus in the Middle
Ages on religion compounded the distinction by equating the mind with the soul, which
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was immortal, and mindlessness with the body, which was mortal. Of course, this
distinction promoted salvation through spiritual cultivation, thereby neglecting the body,
according to Charles.59  The body regained a bit of credibility during the Renaissance
period. It was humanism that made the body respectable and an aspect worthy of
cultivation. However, the seventeenth Century's philosophers obliterated any progress the
body had made. The infamous man behind the dualism was Rene Descartes and his
dictum "I think, therefore, I am."  Descartes' dualism has permeated Western philosophy
and culture. Furthermore, four images of body-person separation, rendered by Descartes,
are prevalent in the field of physical education, according to Kretchmar. The
philosophical school of dualism gave birth to object dualism, value dualism, behavior
dualism, and language dualism.
Object Dualism
The foundation of each one of the four is object dualism. It fundamentally asserts
a la Descartes that a human being is composed of two entities: mind and body. Kretchmar
argues that this separation results in the deification of the mind. The object dualism is
prevalent in the field of athletics despite a trend by physical educators and philosophers
of sport to support a holistic attitude. You may have found yourself engaging in such a
separation in simple conversation. Some examples include: "How is the old 'bod' feeling
today?" "I know how to swing the bat, I just can't make my body do it," and "I'm going to
lose my mind."  Not only does our language demonstrate the dualism; it suggests why we
find this concept initially attractive. The assumed metaphor is that bodies are machines
(again in the Cartesian view). We try to control our bodies and make them do what we
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want. When they are "broken," we go to the doctor to "fix" them. Hence, conventional
Western medicine has prospered using this metaphor.
On account of the firm grasp object dualism has on Western thought, careful
consideration of the criticism is necessary. Kretchmar argues that mind and body are
abstractions. They are unsuccessful in describing the whole-embodied person in
meaningful ways. Evidence to support this criticism stems from the inadequacies of the
machine metaphor. First, it can never fully describe a person, only a more and more
complex machine.60  Second, a mind (and the activity of thinking) is never found apart
from a body or vice versa (except perhaps in death). Third, the question arises as to the
existence and usefulness of a pure mind and pure body with regard to living human
beings. Kretchmar concludes that all human thoughts have traces of body (where you
were born, your chemical make-up, your experiences [bioregionalism]).61  Likewise,
one's physical nature has traces of mind to the extent that our autonomic function and
reflexes are coordinated and end-directed.62  A second and most essential criticism of
object dualism is how two radically distinct entities (mind and body) affect one another.
This point deserves a considerable amount of investigation because movement is critical.
Descartes' Meditations
In the Meditations Rene Descartes he attempt to prove the existence of self, God,
material things, and the distinction between mind and body. Each of these arguments
hinges on the previous one in a very geometrical or scientific format. I argue that it is
only with careful analysis of their contingency on one another that Descartes dilemma
regarding the mind and the body may be understood. The question that concerns the critic
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of Descartes is how the soul63 moves the body. It is brought up through correspondence
with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. She questions Descartes on the distinction between
mind and body and how two entities, such as these form a union, which enables
movement. He cannot successfully respond to her question because he gets caught on two
horns, those being the first and second premise of Princess Elisabeths argument. The
first premise is that the body has extension; the second is that the soul does not have
extension. Therefore, his view of the mind and body cannot be fully accepted because it
fails to answer the important question of movement.
Princess Elisabeth requests an explanation for how the soul of a human can
instigate the body to produce voluntary action. This question comes with prearranged
boundaries, set by herself and Descartes. The first premise consists of her understanding
the assumption of movement regardless of soul. She says, every determination of
movement happens from an impulsion of the thing moved, according to the manner in
which it is pushed by that which moves it.64  In short, if X is a mover, then X has
extension. This claim is contingent on her idea that movement requires contact and
contact requires extension. Descartes develops and defends the second premise, although
Princess Elisabeth originally agrees. She writes that you entirely exclude extension from
your notion of the soul, and contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial
thing.65  This remark can be translated into the second premise stating that the soul is not
extended. This is also confirmed in meditation six. Descartes says, but nevertheless, on
the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking,
non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body.66  These two
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premises prompt the conclusion of the modus tollens structured argument, which is as
follows: the soul is not a mover. Yet, neither Princess Elisabeth nor Descartes believe this
conclusion is true. In order to conclude that the soul is in fact a mover, one of the
premises must be proven false. It is this quest that Descartes fails to accomplish, thereby
making his mind and body argument wrong and/or incomplete.
First, one must attempt to dislodge Descartes from one horn of the dilemma. The
first horn represents the first premise. If X is a mover, then X has extension. Descartes
believes the concept behind this premise is wrong. He thinks Princess Elisabeth is
confused in her understanding of how a body moves a body and how a soul moves a
body. If he can successfully explain the difference and further explain how and why
extension is unnecessary for movement, he can validate the conclusion that the soul is a
mover. He attempts to do so by explaining how qualities affect an object. He believes that
the force for movement does not exist within the qualities of an object. Instead we use
these qualities in order to conceive within our mind movement. Yet, in order to conceive
them, we have sometimes used the notions that are in us for knowing body, and
sometimes those that are for knowing the soul, according as what we attributed to them
has been material or immaterial.67  Descartes uses weight as an example of a quality of
many objects. Yet, he does not believe weight itself denotes the actual substance of that
particular object. It is a tool that we accept to understand how bodies move. For
example, in supposing weight a real quality, of which we possess no other knowledge
save that it has the force of moving the body in which it exists toward the center of the
earth, we have no difficulty conceiving how it moves this body.68  Although he argues
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that there is a difference between the movement of body to body and body to soul, he
gives no account of how the soul moves the body. It remains a mysterious union with no
clear distinction or boundaries. Due to the ambiguous nature of his answer, Descartes
fails to clear himself of the first premise. Princess Elisabeth herself agrees when she says,
I too find that the senses show me that the soul moves the body; but they fail to teach me
the manner in which she does it.69
The second horn Descartes attempts to overcome is the second premise. The soul
has no extension. Since he has not changed the first premise, it is here that he must accept
the extension of the soul in order to conclude that the soul is a mover. Such an acceptance
is exactly what Princess Elisabeth would like because she is not willing to accept the
notion of a mysterious union of movement between the soul and body, since she says,
although extension is not necessary to thought, yet not being contradictory to it, it will
be able to belong to some other function of the soul less essential to her.70  Yet,
Descartes cannot accept this change in the second premise because of the nature of his
methodology and foundation. He uses a scientific method, which reduces the problem
down to the most basic notion of which he can be certain. He then proceeds to build
further arguments on this basis in a similar fashion to a card house. If you remove the
foundation card, the entire house collapses.
The acceptance of a modified second premise negates his original and founding
belief. In order to better understand, one needs to work backward to his original belief
through three logical steps. First, he says there is a conceptual distinction between the
soul and the body. This distinction is evident in his description of each. The soul, also
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referred to as the mind, is made up of the intellect, the imagination, the understanding,
and the will. The body has sense perceptions that relay what is out there to our internal
being, the soul. With an explanation of the difference and content of the soul and body,
one can take the next step in this deconstruction of Descartes argument. After making a
conceptual distinction, Descartes needs to prove that there is an actual distinction. He
believes that God has the power to make this conceptual distinction an actuality.
Descartes says, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is
capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of
it.71  This belief in itself is not enough to prove there is a distinction, but Descartes does
establish an actual distinction in the third step, which is really his first foundation. The
distinction comes in meditation two, where he proves he exists because he thinks. He
calls everything into doubt as described by the geometrical method in an attempt to strip
everything down to a raw foundation. This foundation is that this proposition, I am, I
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.72
His proof of his existence is certain and actual, but is based on the mind and its
immaterial quality. His certainty of existence is in no way attached or founded on the
body.
Because of Descartes highly organized and layered argument structure, he cannot
simply change premise two into an extended soul. It would compromise all previous
beliefs and his argument would crumble as would a card house whose founding card is
pulled out from beneath it. Since Descartes is unsuccessful in this second attempt to
dislodge himself from the horns of Princess Elisabeths argument, his entire mind/body
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argument is cast into doubt. If he cannot answer such an important and practical question
as how the soul moves the body, perhaps his entire view is wrong, or at least severely
flawed.
In order to avoid object dualism, one must keep three things in mind. First, the
body should not be referred to as a possession that you own or bring along. We should be
aware of the language used as it affects one's conception of body and person: You are
your body. Second, we should avoid using the word it as it makes your body impersonal
and an object out in the world as opposed to being you. Third, we should avoid words
such as physical and mental that perpetuates the dualism.
Value Dualism
The second image of body-person separation is value dualism. Kretchmar argues
that its fundamental assertion is that the mind, thinking, and mental activities are superior
to the body, moving, and physical activities. Again, the result is the exaltation of
intellectual education. Value dualism draws on the primary assumption of the first image,
object dualism, in which mind and body are distinct entities. However, value dualism
takes the next step and ranks these two entities by importance. It was Plato who most
clearly exemplifies value dualism in the Phaedo.73   A hierarchy is evident in most
aspects of Plato's work rooted in the intelligible world and the visible world. The range of
dualisms cover soul over body, thought over emotion, and knowledge over sensuous
pleasure.74  However, critics argue that there is no separate world of permanent ideal
forms. This conclusion is supported by the sport example of a softball swing. While we
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may think of an ideal swing, it is difficult to know the picture in each person's head.
Because our thoughts are completely private, how then do we reconcile the
unfalsifiability of the ideal swing?  Furthermore, Plato's ideal forms are not necessary in
order to explain common experience in sport, which is usually based on rules. Plato and
his followers suggest the difference in value is in part due to the accuracy of our faculties.
Thus, the body is continuously in error, while the mind enjoys complete flawlessness.
Kretchmar suggests this picture is not at all the case. It is not true that our sense
perception is highly fallible and mental activity is immune to error. His evidence stems
from Martin Buber's work with love and hate. They are thought to be opposites, but
actually indifference is closer to love's diametric.75  Moreover, why does one believe
thinking has access to truth?  Humans are still biological creatures consequently language
and physiology among others contaminate contemplation (an activity of thinking). Thus,
value dualism proves less fortified by critics such as Kretchmar, and its entrenchment in
Western philosophy and culture demands expulsion.
Behavior Dualism
Behavior dualism focuses on the body's involvement in doing, not thinking, and is
the third image. It fundamentally asserts that thinking must first precede all actions.76
This view results in the glorification of thinking over doing. Behavior dualism is clearly
an outgrowth of both object and value dualism. This image was created when the
following question was posed: "How is skillful human behavior to be explained?"  It was
thought that when hitting a softball two things are happening, not one. These two things
may be referred to as theory and practice or thinking and doing. Kretchmar correctly
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claims this distinction between theory and practice is the logical consequence of viewing
the body as a machine. There must be a game plan or blueprint before the body begins to
act. Critics of behavior dualism, such as Gilbert Ryle, claim thinking and doing are a
false dichotomy for two reasons.77  First, thinking is an activity that may be done well or
poorly. Thus, thinking is an acquired skill. Second, if thinking is a skill, what then
proceeds it or what directs it?  Thus, human behavior runs counter to the process of
behavior dualism. Performers of athletics activities have no experience of two separate
things occurring. Kretchmar argues that there is no such experience because "we receive
invitations intuitively from the sense perceptual world, and accept or reject them."78
Furthermore, one's skillful performance exists when one forgets the body rather than
remembering and directing it.
Language Dualism
The fourth and final image is language dualism, according to which the body is a
processor of nonverbal symbols. Kretchmar points out the fundamental assertion of this
view are that verbal symbols are different from and superior to other kinds of symbols.
Of course, this view results in the deification of words and verbal language, notably in
our society. Our concern is focused on verbal symbols, the importance of which
supersedes other conventions for expression and communication. One criticism of this
view is that language, both verbal and nonverbal, rests on the evolutionary advances of
human beings over lower forms of animal life. Evidence of such a conclusion is that
verbalization is the key to difference between human beings and nonhuman animals.
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"Our formalization of the world and way of stepping away from it requires stand-ins for
experience, which resulted, in language, but this doesn't demonstrate that simply having
language forces us into a privileged position."79  Unarguably cultural visibility and the
popularity of verbal language have in part made it superior. Particularly in the Western
world we have been trained to express ourselves verbally. However, language dualism
tends not to fit our cultural beliefs about art. Art is often deemed as the highest and most
impressive accomplishment of human existence, and yet it is a nonverbal expression.
Holism Doctrine
The four images of body-person do not function in a meaningful way for the
purpose of understanding the self. It is only when bodies are united with persons in a
holistic fashion that this understanding can be accomplished. The philosophy of sport as a
field has developed a doctrine of holism in response to the unsuccessful dualistic
framework of mind/body. It consists of three familiar principles as criticisms of the
dualism. First, we are physical and biological creatures. Persons are united with and
influenced by every thought that one has.80  Second, there is human thought in every
aspect of human existence. The body composition, health, and movement influence it.
Third, one must believe that the whole person is greater than the sum of his or her parts.
Despite the criticism of mind/body dualism and the propagation of these new holistic
ideas the doctrine wasn't readily accepted. The concept of an integrated person who
reflects intelligence from one's chemistry to their movement, and demonstrating their
embodiment in their attitude and values was rejected.
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The doctrine of holism was rethought by Kretchmar and fellow sport philosophers
introduced. Two figures help explain their view. Figure 1 (page 50) is the vertical image
of persons that has traditionally been the view of a person, strongly demarcating the mind
and body. It is this model that needs to be modified into a more holistic approach. There
is only two halves of a person and the arrows in the figure symbolize the two-way
relationship that exists between mind and body in this vertical model.81  While the arrows
demonstrate that the mind affects the body and the body affects the mind, the dotted line
is still problematic because it conceptually creates a dualism. Furthermore, the location of
mind and body, higher and lower respectively, works to reaffirm the hierarchical
relationship between the two.
In order to improve this vision, more work needs to be done to remove the gulf
between the mind and the body. The goal of this work is to change the way we think
about our bodies in terms of medicine, welfare, religion, etc. To attain this new vision
and better picture of persons Kretchmar suggests five holistic principles. The first is to
recognize that physical influences are always at work in shaping all that we are and do.
For instance, we act in a particular time and space under certain chemical and physical
conditions. Second, we must also recognize that the influences of consciousness are
always at work. We are driven by our ideas our perceptions, and our attitudes, which is
reflected in our language (verbal and nonverbal) and our physical activities. Third, there
is no independence of body and mind from each other, with regard to principles one and
two. Physical states and ideas are homogenized into personhood. Fourth, there exist
different levels of behavioral intelligence that range in magnitude from solving complex
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equation to simple arithmetic. Furthermore, this example is equal to the different levels in
behavior ranging from a creative move in basketball to simply lining up for a one-foot
punt. This principle entails the fifth and final principle, which is that different activities
are required for each of the different levels. For example, the activity of kicking a ball
and thinking about kicking a ball are different, but they may be on the same level of
behavioral intelligence granted that the conceived kick is accurately represented in the
actual kicking.
With these five principles a new horizontal interpretation of a person may be
conceived. Figure 2 represents this model (page 50). At the top and bottom are not mind
and body, but two poles of human behavior. The top is sedentary activity, which is that of
reflection and intuition. It is done with little movement and reliance on sensory
perception. The bottom is motor activity that are those things requiring more physical
activity and relies heavily on sense perception. To the left and right each are categorized
into superior and inferior degrees. Returning to our past example of a complex equation
and simple arithmetic. The former would fall in the upper right quadrant of the model
because complex equations require a higher insight or superior mathematical abilities.
While the latter would fall in the upper left quadrant because it is a simple problem. The
same degree delineation is done with the lower half the model for motor activity. In all
the horizontal image of person is far superior to the vertical because it takes into account
the intimate connection between all components of a person and their interaction.
Given the argument for holism and a new idea of how to perceive oneself, women
can more easily function in their newly created world (chapter two). My analysis has
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involved a narrative approach no doubt related to Woolf's influence. However, the
question remains why wilderness sports are an easy entrance into our room rather than
football. Turning to Woolf, she argues in A Room of One's Own that women create
fiction. The verb to create may very well be applied to women and nature. To be
engaging in such an activity of sport, nature is their room and they are able to create
themselves. Not only can they physically transform their bodies and create lean, strong
physiques, buy they also shape and create their own identity. Again, as I state in chapter
one, this narrative is an odyssey for women toward a settled place where they no longer
feel as though they are the deviants in sport. It is the experience of wilderness that is the
catalyst or paintbrush by which women can create their world. I believe this experience is







Figure 1. Vertical Image of Person.














When we get out of the glass bottles of our egos, and when we escape like
squirrels turning in the cages of our personality and get into the forests again, we
shall shiver with cold and fright but things will happened to us so that we don't
know ourselves. Cool, unlying life will rush in, and passions will make our bodies
taut with power, we shall stamp our feet with new power and old things will fall
down, we shall laugh, and institutions will curl up like burnt paper."
D.H. Lawrence
I can recall an experience of wildness I had about seven years ago. I was living in
New Zealand at the time and the day after Christmas my family and I went out on a boat.
After anchoring in a secluded bay, I continued to enjoy the ocean experience with a
snorkeling expedition. It must be understood that I have an irrational and paralyzing fear
of sharks and the sea in general. Thus, to even put my toes in the water required a lot of
effort on my part. However, after much coaxing I got in the clear water in an attempt to
overcome my fear and see the underwater world that intrigued and frightened me so.
After twenty minutes of hyperventilating, the water, colors, fish, and environment got the
better of me and I began to see what was in front of me instead of imagining sharks in my
mind. I flowed in this watery world completely submerged. As Irene Klaver speaks of
presence and disappearance in "Silent Wolves: The Howl of the Implicit," I too can
relate. Tami disappeared, the girl given a name, from a middle-class family, who plays
sports, who speaks English, and something else became present; it was a something else,
not a someone else. I not only transcended myself, but humanity as well. I was so bound
up in the sensory perception that was constantly bombarding me I didn't and couldn't
locate a "me" or an "I."  I followed the fish and the colors of coral. I felt the water change
temperature the deeper I swam. I noticed the fish turn and dart from me as I paddled in
their direction. Yet, if I floated there making no effort in one direction or another; they
remained close and observable. My presence was accepted with silent stillness, but not
without caution. However, their presence was accepted and desired gleefully. I can't
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remember breathing during my time under water. It was as if this experience of wildness
had quenched my biological needs. It had been sufficient to make me live. I was unaware
of myself and living in these few moments, but I was completely and utterly aware of the
life that surrounded me. How can this be?  I'm not certain there was a difference; there
were no boundaries, and suddenly I was the life around me and there was only wildness.
The distinction I had until this point believed of my corporeal body was dissolved. I was
free to be wild without feeling wild. It certainly was a magical event that has rarely
occurred since.
This personal experience of wildness I hope introduces you to the heart and
purpose of this paper. I have been consumed with the process of experiences of wildness
and wilderness. Wilderness is generally thought of as nature, the forest, lakes, mountains,
etc. Yet, wildness is much more abstract and can be found not only in wilderness, but
also in civilization. I believe the distinction is most clearly made in Klaver's piece that
discusses wilderness and wildness as two separate, but related entities and/or ideas. "The
conceptualization of wilderness goes hand in hand with a reduced capacity for living with
the wild, this otherness that is not controlled by human culture."82  It is obvious
throughout the article that her preference is toward wildness, which should be cultivated.
However, through her examples I can't help but paint the picture that wildness exists or is
accessible only through wilderness. I don't believe she would agree with this statement
and that her intent for this paper was not the previous statement; however, I think her
examples belie her beliefs. While this experience isn't a sport exactly, it has many
characteristics of it. Recall Kretchmar's discussion of an inefficient means and a problem
in play and games. The fish with which I swam played hide and seek with me. If I wanted
to succeed at my task, I had to remain still. I had to obey the rules of nature.
My attention was drawn to this topic after having just thought about what
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constitutes a wild experience. Certainly wild experiences do not exist only when one is
deep in the woods. So, my question is what makes an experience in untamed nature
(wilderness) different than walking through downtown Fort Worth in the middle of the
night alone, with respect to wildness. Both involve a certain degree of risk. One is risk
from animals and natural forces and the other being a risk from our fellow human beings.
Thus, is the knowledge taken away from both experiences equally important and useful in
our discussion of wildness?
The experience of wildness in wilderness is romanticized and viewed as a
"growing experience," a vision quest of sorts, while a walk through a bad neighborhood
is considered stupid. Why the distinction?  Is there something in wilderness that contains
wildness?  I too fall into the trap of viewing the former experience as "better" if we can
label it as such. Perhaps experiences of wildness are easier to come by in wilderness
versus civilization because civilization is already structured. I think that structure and
organization play a part in our experiences of wildness. Things begin to fall apart in
wilderness; no longer are we enclosed in our glass bottles (neither physically nor
mentally); we leave ourselves open to the physical elements, but also to the power of
chaos. Suddenly life rushes in at a pace and force that we cannot control nor can we label
it. Perhaps like an autistic child, wilderness leaves us helpless. Moreover, I am inclined to
say experiences of wildness in wilderness are "better" because we are at a more foreign
risk. While our cultural risk (walking in Ft. Worth) presents a dangerous situation, it is
perhaps more predictable than that of our natural risk. We enjoy a certain connection with
humans, whether we know them or not, thus being approached by one is not as alien as
being approached by a mountain lion. Thus, the exotic nature of the experience may play
some role in the degree of wildness. While we may see and proclaim ourselves part of
nature, such an identity is a bit uncomfortable and perhaps even suffocating when we
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introduce ourselves into nature for extended periods of time. I'm not sure exactly what it
is, but something exists in the experience Klaver wrote about which contains wildness
that does not reside as deeply in those more cultural experiences of wildness. Does wild
experience have to involve any risk at all?  Or is it simple the availing of one's self to a
wild experience that is risky?  I ask this question because to encounter wildness you have
to let go to some extent. Letting go and being out of control either physically or mentally
is a risk in itself. Maybe this risk is where wildness originates?
In continuing my search for what an experience of wildness is with respect to risk
and wilderness, I'm drawn to personal accounts of nature experiences or experiences of
wildness in wilderness as opposed to civilization. The reoccurring theme is that of
personal connection and embodiment or more vaguely the self. Personal accounts are the
structured and civilized reflection of those moments of wildness. Phrases such as "in the
High Sierra, was the essence of Elizabeth," "a hunger she couldn't satisfy," "she could
discover what it was she so badly needed," conjure up ideas of a soul/self lost in the mind
and/or body and are only willing to be revealed under very particular conditions. It
reminds me of the different roles we play in this world. I may greet the world with a very
different face when I'm at a conference and the "real Tami" is hidden because the
conditions aren't appropriate. However, in the comfort and security of my home and
family I can "be myself."  Perhaps the self/soul suffers from multiple roles or timidity as
well and only presents itself in comfortable secure surroundings. These surrounds may in
fact be wildness in the context and/or location of wilderness. Yet, one does not
immediately feel comfortable under these conditions, thus keeping the problem
continuously present, as is the case in a game according to Weiss. However, the answer
may not lie down the road of self-awareness, but of unawareness. Such an unawareness
does not entail that you don't recognize your own actions or how other's view you, but
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that you may not be capable of locating a self in these moment of wildness. As my
opening personal account illustrates I, "Tami," was no longer present. My physical body
remained but my mental state permeated the wilderness. Instead of drawing in all my
observations, labeling them, organizing them, and continuing to structure and construct
"the world," I was part of the world and could no longer engage in these thought
experiments. Such is a disappearance is what one finds in the realms of sport. The
thinking is not separate from the action, but simultaneous. Structuring is only possible if
you step out of the system, if you submerge yourself no longer are you in a position to
draw boundary lines. As Klaver describes in her article, one has disappeared and yet
remains present.
As I stated before, it is the risk factor that contributes to the feelings that inspire
the previous phrases in personal accounts. Risk is constantly present in sport. One is
putting himself or herself at risk when attempting to solve a problem. These risks are
multiple and varied, ranging from the risk of failure to the risk of injury. Can something
be risky and comfortable at the same time?  This question leads to another important
question. Do those people who engage in wilderness experiences regularly experience the
element of risk?  Would they consider their experience to be one of wildness?  In
searching for the answers to these questions, perhaps I've sought the wrong location, in
terms of the purely natural experiences I've unknowingly fallen into Plumwood's dualism
of nature and culture, by trying to rid one of the other all together to achieve some clarity.
Yet, it is not that simple. Perhaps it isn't something inherent in nature or wilderness that
makes for "better" experiences of wildness, but it is merely the conditions it offers the
majority of people. Thus, this notion of risk is a good place to start. What risks are taken
when in wilderness?  Unlike risks in relationships the risks involved is almost always
bodily. The body is at risk to the elements as well as whatever wild animals may be
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lurking in the bushes. In fact, when you look at extreme sports or simply individuals that
spend great lengths in wilderness they keep "upping the ante" so to speak. They take
bigger and better risks to satisfy that hunger or have an experience of wildness. Could it
be then, that the concept of embodiment as it is used in the philosophy of sport plays an
important role in determining the function of risk in experiences of wildness?  I am not
denying the mind's influence and importance, but my focus for the moment is on the
body. Attending once more to the personal accounts of wilderness, one finds them
flooded with sense-data descriptions of their environments and what transpires between
those and themselves. The senses are heightened and aware of much more than typically
is the case. These impressions are exceedingly forceful. They strike the mind with such
veracity (a la Hume) as to in some instances actually will or enable the body to exceed its
ordinary limitations. Furthermore, pain and pleasure dissolve into one sensation in
extreme moments. Or perhaps one is even beyond these sentient experiences. This
collapse of sensory experience certainly speaks to the body's commitment to the
experience.
Embodiment, in the philosophy of sport, is a fundamental condition of
personhood. A human being is always located somewhere and human consciousness is
never free of bodily constraints. The direction I want to take is embedded in stories of
wildness, personal accounts of wilderness sports ranging from hiking, climbing, and
tracking. I cannot seem to let go of this particular line in a story of wilderness, We have
stolen something from her.83  The her is a bear that had been captured to be tagged
and subjected to blood tests for scientific purposes for the future protection of the bear.
The narrator makes this statement as the bear is being released back into the wild and her
home. In attempting to determine what the narrator means by something being stolen
from the bear and by we (human beings) being those culpable I remember Aristotle. If
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he was correct and we are a rational animal, but still an animal, can we venture to guess
that something was stolen from us?  I want by this question to push the issue of
experiences of wildness in wilderness. If indeed we are part of nature and wilderness,
then it is safe to say that our arrival into a world of computers, cell phones, fast food
restaurants, and cable television is at least in part an effect of losing that which keeps us
more intimately connected to wilderness.
But back to our immediate project, the bear. What was stolen from the bear in
Simpsons story?  The bear was tracked, tranquilized, tested, and ornamented with tags
and a radio collar. Nothing tangible or physical was taken, but perhaps the way the bear
understood the world was taken away. Her perception is now altered. Perhaps her
confidence and security is depleted?  Perhaps she knows now she is at risk?  Can the risk
factor she faces be equated to that which Ive spoken of previously in term of a humans
experience of wildness?  Or was nothing taken at all?  What makes our capturing her
different from her capturing prey and devouring it?  Intentionality?  Yet, even if we
accept this explanation that our (human beings) intentions play a role we are still left
with the problem of recognition. The bears recognition of our intentions and how they
differ from her own intention toward her prey must be recognized. Can we assume that
the bear is capable of such a perception?  Or are we to question intentionality more at the
gut/emotive level?  Can intentions be understood by animals because they are motivated
by emotions which supposedly many animals can sense more so than humans?
Was it freedom that was stolen, even just briefly?  Was it wildness?  Was it the
bears illusion?  Or was it our own illusion?  I believe the statement, We have stolen
something from her, is not a reflection of a loss by the bear, but a loss on the part of the
narrator and humans in general. She, the narrator, has lost her own illusion of how bears
and nature work. She uses labels thing "stolen" or "lost" because the experience does not
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fit into her organized world. One enjoys creating illusions of how this world should be
and to some extend we can control it (such as in civilization). However, nature robs us of
our illusions. It robs us of a romantic vision of bears and wolves. We lose control and
lines are crossed and bodies and egos are bruised sometimes beyond repair. It is in these
instances that wildness reveals itself. It is not jewel covered and crowned in gold. It is
raw and thorny, and bloody, and muddy and beautiful. We tend to revolt against it at first,
refusing to accept the roots of our own bodies and hearts. We use words to comfort
ourselves, but they are not sufficient. Again I argue that the narrator of this bear story lost
her own illusions. The narrator for the first time saw a bear up close in a situation of
dominance. She had little fear because the bear was sedated and she saw the bear through
different eyes. What had been a mystery and blurred by romantic literature and tall tales
now was evident before her and the mysterious appeal was gone. Perhaps her
understanding of the bear was transformed into something cold and hard and she is
attributing her own loss to the bear. Humans can be mistaken in what they see or
perceive to be true.
I do believe that some element of risk is necessary for an experience of wildness,
which I have hinted at earlier in this paper. Yet, I must make clear to myself that this
concept of risk in experiences of wildness. It has been argued that one can distinguish a
difference in risk between the body and the mind/soul/heart. Yet, I think difference
between emotional risk and physical risk is a result of the dualistic framework. In our
daily interaction with friends, peers, colleagues, and family, we see that they guard their
emotional self more than their physical self. For centuries poems have been written about
lost love. The pain of the heart is described in terms of physical injuries, but only
analogously, it doesn't capture the true feelings. Furthermore, the pain endured upon
heartache comes in a different order than that from physical risk in the wilderness I think.
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Consider what happens when your significant other tells you that your relationship is
over. No physical pain precedes the words. Yet, after the words are spoken, a sinking of
the heart, a quickness and shortage of breath, soon follows. The words and emotions felt
are the catalyst for the physical changes. Yet, in the wilderness physical changes such as
scratches, cuts, and bruises often are the catalysts for a change in emotions or a change of
heart. It seems the order of the two is opposite. While semantically we may demarcate
two selves, it is obvious they interact and effect one another.
What does this example say about the difference in risk?  The body plays a very
important role in experiences of wildness. I think this role works to support my use of
embodiment, tying it into the philosophy of sport. These ideas of embodiment and risk
also support spending time in nature, locating oneself physically in their environment
because stimulation of the body is stimulation of the self. The pursuit of this line of
thinking works to support my idea that in wilderness sports women find something,
which they may not otherwise find. This finding may be a result of their traditional roles
as meek people, whose physical bodies are constantly protected, which in turn excludes
them from many experiences of wildness. Yet, breaking out of the historic mold of what
it is to be feminine places them in a new environment, one in which physical risks are
now a reality and lend themselves to new mental and emotional changes as well. For
example, Susan Griffin plays off the physical attributes and processes of the female body
in an attempt to demonstrate mans domination over her. The sexual organs of the woman
are not seen as virtuous. They are something to be hidden not only from men, but from
ourselves as well. They are considered dirty or impure. Todays culture illustrates the
desire for women to be pure clearly with its pushing of consumer products for feminine
hygiene. Douches and cleansing pads are necessary to keep women feeling fresh and
pure. Never mind the fact that douches are medically proven to destroy the natural
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bacteria in the vagina necessary for a healthy body. Many women who use douches
regularly suffer yeast infections (or more complicated problems) as the body attempts to
replenish the bacteria.
Griffin points out that the value of the female body, according to men, is
dependent on the context (or a means to an end) not for the body itself.84  For example,
the female body is viewed positively in the role in reproduction. There is some
recognition of the goodness of the female body to conceive and carry a child. Yet, this
appreciation on mans part is not without limitation. Although he sees the body as a
producer, he still wants to control the condition of the birth. Griffin uses the analogy of
the cow and calf relationship before, during, and after birth to demonstrate mans
interference with a process he has no first hand knowledge of (nor could he ever). The
man separates the woman from her womb with a sheet and when the baby is born it is
whisked away to be cleaned (because the fluids and placenta inside the woman and on the
baby are dirty and must immediately be washed away). Even before the event of birth
when girls are coming of age and menstruation commence, it is somehow separate from
society, family, and the woman. This aspect of the female body and process is considered
unfavorable. It is viewed as unclean and something to be a shamed of. It is something that
happened to the girl, therefore, she must have done something to deserve it.
Women do not see menstruation as a part of who they are, what makes them
unique. Granted it is a nuisance from time to time with the pain, but our bodies literally
change during this time. Many argue it is moodiness and confusion, but perhaps it is a
pull in the direction of wildness and nature. We possess this remarkable ability to
conceive a living organism. Our tie to the soil and all that is fecund is literally felt during
those seven days of each month. For a moment, we lose ourselves in the flow of our body
and are not tied down by civilization, but attempt to return to nature and the wildness,
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which lies dormant deep inside us.
To conclude this thesis in the same fashion it was started, I would like to write
about a wilderness experience that I had during our expedition weekend to the Wichita
Mountains. I wanted to focus on what we've spoken about before, the element of risk in
wilderness. I had assumed that risk was a key component in having an experience of
wildness. However, there were times over the weekend, just sitting on the rocks at the top
of Elk Mountain that I had an experience of wildness with no element of risk.
Furthermore, I have been assuming up until now that an experience in wilderness with
risk or perhaps now without risk would be a positive experience and force people to
reflect on the beauty and mystery of nature. My hope was to create a basis for an
emotively charged environmental ethic. However, this weekend on our "shortcut" trip
over Elk Mountain I discovered I may have been wrong.
I sat on a warm flat boulder overlooking the river and juniper trees below and
reflected on how far I could see and what was just beyond the horizon. I was excited
about our little adventure, but secure in the fact that the car was just down the road and
our campsite wasn't far from that and in fact Lawton was only a five-minute drive away. I
began wondering what thoughts must have been running through the heads of the first
pioneers to come through this country. What did they think of it?  Was it beautiful to
them, or was it dry and rough with little concern for them?  Did they look off into the
horizon and instead of wanting to explore it. Did they want it to end?  I can't help but
wonder if they said to themselves, "When will we reach the end?"  Perhaps their
experiences were nothing like mine despite it being the same land.
So, how is it then that what I want to do won't turn on me and create contempt and
disgust toward the environment based on a negative experience of wilderness?  I dont
have an answer for this question and it seems to be a rather large one that needs attention
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if I am to pursue this line of thinking. It is being "open" to the experience of wildness or
wilderness, but then does this presuppose some affection and interest in nature before one
heads out into the wilderness?  I've given it some thought, and to answer my own
question, I think a presupposition of nature is not causally connected to an experience of
wildness. Experiences of wildness include both positive and negative attributes. Hiking
on a trail and slipping on a rock only to fall into an ice cold creek is not all together
unpleasant because it still creates an environment that you can't control. Should only
"good" things happened in wilderness you've not understood fully what it is to step out of
your boundaries. As a friend of mine says, "The adventure doesn't begin until things go
wrong."85  I suppose this remark is true' not until things go the opposite of your plans do
you fully understand the power that lies in nature and life. Not until you understand this
power can it engulf you as is explicit in the following D. H. Lawrence quote. "Cool,
unlying life will rush in, and passions will make our bodies taut with power, we shall
stamp our feet with new power and old things will fall down, we shall laugh, and
institutions will curl up like burnt paper."
Reflections on thesis
Upon reflection of my philosophical musings, ranging from ecofeminism to the
philosophy of sport, uncertainty and discontent settle into the pit of my stomach. I have
introduced this thesis with the problem of dualism responsible for the discrimination
women have suffered in the realm of sport and continued to frame chapters two and three
dualistically. In chapter two, my summary and account of the semantic influence of play,
game, sport, and  athletics on the modes of internal and external behavior suggest
compartmentalizing each activity as separate unto itself. I argue that such  partitions work
to isolate women. Furthermore, my discussion in chapter three of persons related to either
Cartesian dualism or embodiment continues my attack on the dualistic framework.
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However, I believe I have simplified the problem of conceptual discrimination of
women in sport with my focus solely on dualism. The problem is much more complex.
Upon reading several more narrative accounts of wilderness adventures from women I
found it difficult to simply divide up their thoughts, actions, and attitudes into
background and foreground. Like an impressionist painting by Claude Monet or Vincent
van Gogh the lines appear clearly formed by each stroke from a distance. However, the
closer one steps to the painting soon he or she discovers the forms are no more than
quick, short, and imprecise dabs of paint. In fact one soon wants to step away from the
painting and retain the distance of clarity. However, in reality the boundaries are blurred
and the difficult lies in teasing them apart. I feel I am just now stepping up to the painting
of women in sport and while my thesis thus far has provided me with a working
knowledge of the subject, my work is by no means complete. In the future, I intend to
confront the canvas, the paint, and the brush strokes that have fashioned this portrait.
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